Public Long-Term Care Insurance and the Housing and Living Arrangements of the Elderly: Evidence from Medicare Home Health Benefits by Engelhardt, Gary V & Greenhalgh-Stanley, Nadia
Syracuse University 
SURFACE 
Economics - Faculty Scholarship Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs 
12-2008 
Public Long-Term Care Insurance and the Housing and Living 
Arrangements of the Elderly: Evidence from Medicare Home 
Health Benefits 
Gary V. Engelhardt 
Syracuse University 
Nadia Greenhalgh-Stanley 
Syracuse University 
Follow this and additional works at: https://surface.syr.edu/ecn 
 Part of the Economics Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Engelhardt, Gary V. and Greenhalgh-Stanley, Nadia, "Public Long-Term Care Insurance and the Housing 
and Living Arrangements of the Elderly: Evidence from Medicare Home Health Benefits" (2008). 
Economics - Faculty Scholarship. 140. 
https://surface.syr.edu/ecn/140 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs at 
SURFACE. It has been accepted for inclusion in Economics - Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of 
SURFACE. For more information, please contact surface@syr.edu. 
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1360926
 
 
PUBLIC LONG-TERM CARE INSURANCE AND THE HOUSING AND  
LIVING ARRANGEMENTS OF THE ELDERLY:  
EVIDENCE FROM MEDICARE HOME HEALTH BENEFITS 
 
 
Gary V. Engelhardt and Nadia Greenhalgh-Stanley 
 
CRR WP 2008-15 
Released: December 2008 
Date Submitted: October 2008 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Center for Retirement Research at Boston College 
Hovey House 
140 Commonwealth Avenue 
Chestnut Hill, MA 02467 
Tel: 617-552-1762 Fax: 617-552-0191 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The research reported herein was pursuant to a grant from the U.S. Social Security 
Administration (SSA) funded as part of the Retirement Research Consortium (RRC).  The 
findings and conclusions expressed are solely those of the authors and do not represent the views 
of SSA, any agency of the Federal Government, the RRC, or Boston College.  
 
 
 
© 2008, by Gary V. Engelhardt and Nadia Greenhalgh-Stanley. All rights reserved. Short 
sections of text, not to exceed two paragraphs, may be quoted without explicit permission 
provided that full credit, including © notice, is given to the source.
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1360926
 
 
About the Center for Retirement Research 
The Center for Retirement Research at Boston College, part of a consortium that includes 
parallel centers at the University of Michigan and the National Bureau of Economic 
Research, was established in 1998 through a grant from the Social Security 
Administration. The Center’s mission is to produce first-class research and forge a strong 
link between the academic community and decision makers in the public and private 
sectors around an issue of critical importance to the nation’s future.  To achieve this 
mission, the Center sponsors a wide variety of research projects, transmits new findings 
to a broad audience, trains new scholars, and broadens access to valuable data sources. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Center for Retirement Research at Boston College 
Hovey House 
140 Commonwealth Avenue 
Chestnut Hill, MA 02467 
phone: 617-552-1762 fax: 617-552-0191 
e-mail: crr@bc.edu 
www.bc.edu/crr 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Affiliated Institutions: 
The Brookings Institution 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
Syracuse University 
Urban Institute 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
We provide empirical evidence on the extent to which long-term care insurance affects the 
housing and living arrangements of the elderly by examining plausibly exogenous changes in the 
supply of long-term care insurance through the Medicare program that occurred in the late 
1990s.  Prior to 1997, Medicare reimbursed home health care agencies on a retrospective-cost 
basis.  Then, starting in October, 1997, as a result of the Balanced Budget Act of 1997 (BBA97), 
Medicare switched to a system of prospective payments for home health care, which induced 
state-by-calendar-year variation in the supply of this type of public long-term care insurance.  
We exploit this variation to econometrically identify the impact on the housing and living 
arrangements of the elderly, using CPS data from 1995-2000 (before and after the law change).  
Our estimates indicate that living arrangements are quite responsive to home health care benefits. 
The estimated elasticity of shared living to benefits is 0.7−  over all elderly and 1−  for widowed 
elderly.  However, these benefits have little impact on household headship among the elderly.  
This suggests that the bulk of the shared-living response occurred through co-residents living in 
elderly households.  There is some weak evidence that increases in benefits raised elderly 
homeownership.   
 
Introduction 
 
As the American population ages and end-of-life medical costs rise, there is growing interest in 
insurance markets for long-term care.  Because the private market for such insurance is small, 
and the publicly provided insurance in the form of Medicaid only covers older individuals who 
are sufficiently poor, particular attention has been placed on increasing coverage through tax 
incentives and the expansion of existing programs.   
Housing economists should be keenly interested in long-term care insurance for at least 
four reasons.  First, unlike many other goods, there is a close link between functional status, 
health, and housing decisions, especially among older individuals (Engelhardt, 2005).  In 
particular, housing and health are likely complements in consumption.  Given the great desire of 
the elderly to live independently and age in place, long-term care insurance, which transfers 
resources from healthy to sick states of the world, may allow older individuals to stay in their 
homes longer, thus raising elderly homeownership rates.  Second, such insurance provides a 
funding source for the purchase of market-based services that may substitute for home-produced, 
informal care.  This may attenuate the incidence of shared living arrangements and influence 
household-formation decisions among the elderly, key determinants of housing demand.  Third, 
because housing wealth can be used to self-insure against long-term care expenditures, there are 
direct linkages between motives for and the timing of housing wealth decumulation and the 
demand for long-term care insurance, as well as other actuarial products, such as private 
annuities and reverse mortgages (Davidoff, 2008a, 2008b).  Finally, housing wealth receives 
favorable treatment in means-tested social insurance programs targeted to the aged, particularly 
Medicaid, the primary insurer against large long-term care expenses.  Therefore, the structure of 
public long-term care insurance may influence the relative demand for housing assets. 
Whereas there is a voluminous literature in urban and public economics on housing 
decisions, there has been remarkably little recent housing research on the elderly in general, and 
even less on the impact of long-term care on elderly housing decisions in particular.1  The small 
                                                 
1 In a recent literature survey by Dietz and Haurin (2003), only one-and-a-half out of fifty pages and 11 out of 251 
articles surveyed were devoted to elderly housing, and there were no studies devoted to the impact of long-term care 
insurance on housing decisions.  There is, however, a long literature in health economics and health services 
research on long-term care (e.g., Norton, 2000). 
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existing empirical housing literature on the elderly has focused primarily on the extent to which 
the elderly decumulate housing equity as they age (e.g., Merill, 1984; Feinstein and McFadden, 
1989; Reschovsky, 1990; Megbolugbe, Sa-Aadu, and Shilling, 1997, 1999; Venti and Wise, 
1989, 1990, 2000, 2001) and analyses of the potential market for reverse mortgages (Mayer and 
Simons, 1994; Kutty, 1998; Venti and Wise, 1991; among others).  An important exception is the 
recent work of Davidoff (2008a, 2008b), who has begun to explore the interplay between 
housing wealth and the demand for long-term care insurance and annuities. 
The primary aim of the current paper is to provide empirical evidence on the first two 
topics above: the extent to which long-term care insurance affects the housing and living 
arrangements of the elderly.2  Because the decisions to purchase private long-term care insurance 
and housing are almost surely jointly determined, we do not focus on the market for private 
insurance.  Instead, we attempt to identify the impact on housing and living arrangements by 
examining plausibly exogenous changes in the supply of public long-term care insurance through 
the Medicare program that occurred in the late 1990’s.  Specifically, Medicare—the primary 
insurer for acute care among those 65 and older—reimburses expenditures for home health care, 
which is long-term care delivered in a home setting. Unlike Medicaid, Medicare eligibility is not 
means-tested.   
Prior to 1997, Medicare reimbursed home health care agencies on a retrospective-cost 
basis.  In 1996, for example, 15% of 75-84 year olds and 26% of those 85 and older received 
home health care benefits, and expenditure represented 10% of total Medicare program 
payments. Then, starting in October, 1997, as a result of the Balanced Budget Act of 1997 
(BBA97), Medicare switched to a system of prospective payments for home health care.  This 
resulted in a 30% decline in Medicare expenditures on home health care and a substantial decline 
in home health care use.  Importantly, up through 2000, the new prospective payment system 
was implemented in a way that effectively differed across states, so that the 1997 law induced 
state-by-calendar-year variation in the supply of this type of public long-term care insurance.  
We exploit this variation to econometrically identify the impact on the housing and living 
arrangements of the elderly, using data on over 57,000 elderly families from 1995-2000 (before 
and after the law change) from the March Current Population Surveys (CPS).   
                                                 
2 We discuss the implications for our findings for the other two topics in the conclusion.  
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 There are three primary findings.  First, our estimates indicate that increases in home 
health care benefits decrease the incidence of shared living arrangements among the elderly: the 
elasticity of shared living to benefits is 0.7−  over all elderly and 1−  for widowed elderly.  
Second, there was little impact on household headship among the elderly.  This suggests that the 
bulk of the shared-living response occurred through co-residents living in elderly households 
(and not the reverse).  Finally, there is some, but weak, evidence that increases in benefits raised 
elderly homeownership, with an elasticity of 0.2  for all elderly.  Overall, the results suggest that 
future expansions in public benefits have the potential to alter elderly housing and living 
arrangements significantly.   
 The paper is organized as follows.  Section II gives background on long-term care, 
Medicare home health benefits, and the Balanced Budget Act of 1997.  Section III discusses 
findings from the previous literature.  Section IV describes the CPS and the construction of the 
analysis dataset.  It draws on some of the methods and exposition developed in a companion set 
of papers on the impact of Social Security on the elderly by Engelhardt (2008), Engelhardt, 
Gruber, and Perry (2005) and Engelhardt and Gruber (2005, 2006).  Section V charts the time-
series evolution of elderly living arrangements, headship, and homeownership during the period 
of study.  Sections VI and VII discuss the regression framework and estimation results, 
respectively.  The paper ends with a summary of findings, a discussion of caveats, and directions 
for future research.   
 
II.  Background  
 
Broadly speaking, long-term care can be defined as the receipt of assistance or help with 
at least one Activity of Daily Living (ADL)—bathing, eating, dressing, walking across a room, 
and getting in and out of bed—or one Instrumental Activity of Daily Living (IADL)—using a 
telephone, taking medication, handling money, shopping, and preparing meals.  Under this 
definition, of 34.5 million individuals 65 and older, there were 5.5 million receiving long-term 
care in 1999, of which only 30% were institutionalized (United States Congress, Committee on 
Ways and Means, 2004).  In addition to informal care provided by family and friends, there are 
three main classes of formal providers of long-term care for the elderly: nursing homes, assisted 
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living facilities, and home health care agencies.  In 2001, just after our sample period, long-term 
care spending represented 12.2% of all U.S. health care spending, and was financed 48.3% by 
Medicaid, which is public health insurance for the poor, 14.2% by Medicare, which is public 
health insurance for the aged, 22% by out-of-pocket payments, 9.6% by private insurance, and 
5.9% through other means (United States Congress, Committee on Ways and Means, 2004).   
While Medicaid traditionally has always been the primary source of funding for such 
expenditures, Medicare experienced rapid growth in the 1990’s in expenditures on long-term 
care administered in the form of home health care benefits, which cover care by a certified home 
health care agency in the residence of a home-bound individual if intermittent or part-time 
skilled nursing or other therapy is necessary.  Importantly, although a physician-approved 
treatment plan is required, there are no limitations on the duration of these benefits, and no 
deductibles or co-payments.   
Figure 1 plots real annual Medicare home health care expenditures (in $2001) for 1982-
2000 taken from various issues of the Health Care Financing Administration’s Medicare and 
Medicaid Statistical Supplement.  After remaining relatively small in the early 1980’s, home 
health expenditures began to rise rapidly after coverage was expanded in 1988, from about $2 
billion to $18 billion in 1997.  During this period, Medicare reimbursed home health care 
services on a retrospective-cost basis, essentially at actual cost up to a national-average cost cap.  
In an effort to control rapidly rising costs, the Balanced Budget Act of 1997 (BBA97) mandated 
that Medicare move from a retrospective to a prospective payment system (PPS) for home health 
care agencies by 2000.   
From 1997-2000, Medicare instituted an interim prospective payment system (IPS), in 
which each agency’s reimbursement was capped annually, based on a weighted average of the 
agency’s 1994 average cost (75% weight) and the 1994 Census division’s average cost (25% 
weight).  The IPS had the effect of changing reimbursement rates differentially across time and 
location according to the (pre-determined) cost structure in 1994.  As illustrated in Figure 1, the 
introduction of the IPS substantially reduced Medicare home health care total spending.   
In addition, Figure 2 plots home health care spending per user, participation, and visits 
per user.  In the figure, the series for participation and visits are shown in index form, where the 
base year (1982) is scaled to equal 100, and the two series are re-scaled so that they fit on the 
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same axes.  The text box in the top left gives the base-year values to convert the index to levels.   
Expenditures per user, participation, and visits per user track each other very closely.  Therefore, 
by a variety of metrics, the introduction of the IPS substantially reduced Medicare home health 
care activity. 
 
III.  Existing Studies 
 
There are four strands in the existing literature that are particularly relevant.  The first is a 
set of recent studies that have examined the impact of Medicaid, the largest source of long-term 
care insurance, on the demand for private long-term insurance (Brown and Finkelstein, 2004; 
Brown, Coe, and Finkelstein, 2006), housing wealth (Coe, 2007), and homeownership 
(Greenhalgh-Stanley, 2008) using data from the 1990’s drawn from the Health and Retirement 
Study.  In general, they have concluded that the structure of Medicaid not only crowds out 
purchases of private long-term care insurance, but also affects end-of-life housing decisions.  
With the exception of Greenhalgh-Stanley (2008), those studies have relied only on cross-state 
variation in Medicaid eligibility rules, as there has been essentially very little recent time-series 
policy variation that has differed across states.   
The second is a set of studies on the impact of other social insurance programs on the 
housing and living arrangements of the elderly.   These include work investigating the impact on 
living arrangements of Social Security by Michael, Fuchs, and Scott (1976), McGarry and 
Schoeni 2000, Engelhardt, Gruber, and Perry (2005), and Costa (1999) on state Old Age 
Assistance programs.  These studies have concluded that elderly living arrangements are quite 
responsive to Social Security benefits.  In particular, Engelhardt, Gruber, and Perry (2005) used 
year-of-birth variation in benefits from the Social Security “notch” and estimated elasticities of 
shared living with respect to benefits of 0.4−  for all elderly and 1.3−  for widowed elderly.  
Engelhardt (2008) examined the effects of Social Security on homeownership and headship 
decisions.  He estimated elasticities of homeownership with respect to benefits of 0.5  for all 
elderly and 0.7  for widowed elderly, and elasticities of headship with respect to benefits of 0.1  
for all elderly and 0.3  for widowed elderly.  In combination, these studies suggest that elderly 
housing and living arrangements are quite responsive to social insurance benefits.   
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A third strand has focused more narrowly on the impact of public home care subsidies on 
informal care and living arrangements.  The most ambitious of these is Hoerger, Picone, and 
Sloan (1996) who estimated a structural multinomial probit model of the impact of public 
subsidies and informal care on elderly living arrangements (nursing home, intergenerational, and 
independent living) using data from the 1982, 1984, and 1989 National Long-Term Care 
Surveys.  Qualitatively, they found that increases in Supplemental Security Income (SSI) and the 
Medicaid home health care subsidy lowered the likelihood of shared living.  However, 
quantitatively, our calculations based on their estimated marginal effects and sample means 
suggest very low elasticities of shared living with respect to these policy variables.  Another 
important study is Pezzin, Kemper, and Reschovsky (1996), who presented experimental 
evidence from the early 1980’s on the impact on living arrangements from randomly assigned 
home care subsidies from the Channeling Experiment.  Again, qualitatively, they found that 
increases in care subsidies lowered the likelihood of shared living, but the quantitative effects 
were quite small. 
The final strand in the literature consists of specific studies on the impact of the changes 
to Medicare home health care from BBA97.  While there are a number of studies in health 
services research on specific health-related aspects of the reform, there are two economic studies 
that are most closely related to ours.  The first is McKnight (2006), who studied the impact of 
BBA97 on Medicare home health care utilization, expenditure, and patient health, using 
individual data from the Medicare Current Beneficiary Survey (MCBS).  She exploited the fact 
that under IPS the weighted-average reimbursement cap at the agency level generated state-level 
variation in reimbursements and utilization as well.  In particular, states with 1994 Medicare 
home health care expenditures below the Census-division average (which, of course, had 
agencies with below-average costs) saw their utilization rise after (relative to before) BBA97, 
compared to states with above-Census-division-average costs, where utilization was measured by 
the number of home visits per home health user.  Using this variation in visits per user in a 
difference-in-difference regression framework, she found that while private out-of-pocket 
medical expenditures rose 22 cents for each dollar decline in Medicare expenditures, there was 
no discernable impact on elderly health.  
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One potential explanation for this is that in response to the decline in the generosity of 
Medicare reimbursements for home health care, families substituted informal care for the 
purchase of market-based services from home health care agencies.3  In our analysis below, we 
focus on a complement to informal care, shared living arrangements.  After we commenced our 
analysis and received funding for this project from the Social Security Administration, we were 
made aware of an unpublished study by Orsini (2007), who used methods similar to McKnight’s 
and found a fairly substantial impact on shared living from the law change.   
Orsini’s study shares a number of features with our approach.  Like ours, it examines the 
impact of the change in Medicare home health care benefits from BBA97 on living arrangements 
and even uses data from the CPS.  That said, our analysis differs from hers in three ways.  First, 
given that there is evidence from other studies that the elderly respond to social insurance 
benefits in their homeownership and headship decisions, we focus on a broader set of behavioral 
responses that include these outcomes.  Second, because of measurement problems caused by the 
re-design of the CPS in 1994, we limit our analysis to 1995-2000.  We discuss this in detail in 
the next section.  Orsini (2007) focuses on a longer time period, 1988-2000, and does not 
account for the changes in the CPS format.  Finally, we lay out an instrumental variable approach 
that utilizes state-by-calendar-year variation in Medicare reimbursement caps, measured using 
home health average expenditures per user as dictated by the legislation.  Orsini (1997) instead 
uses a measure of policy restrictiveness developed by McKnight (2006), based on home health 
care visits per user, and a reduced-form approach.4   
 
IV.  Data Construction 
 
To identify the impact on housing and living arrangements from the reduction in home 
health benefits from BBA97, we draw data from the Current Population Surveys (CPS) of 
March, 1996 through 2001.  The primary advantage of the CPS is that the Housing Vacancy 
Survey, which is the official government source of homeownership rates, is a derivative of the 
                                                 
3 Unfortunately, McKnight could not study this, as informal care is not measured in the MCBS.  Charles and Sevak 
(2005) and Mellor (2001), among others, have studied substitution via informal care. 
4 At the end of her analysis, Orsini presents a two-sample IV estimate of the impact of visits on living arrangements 
using her reduced-form estimates and McKnight’s first-stage estimates.  However, the IV strategy is not the focus of 
the analysis, as it is in our study. 
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CPS, so that the CPS is the ideal survey data source to study for homeownership.  The primary 
disadvantage is that the CPS only samples non-institutionalized individuals, thus omitting elderly 
in nursing homes.  To the extent that the decline in Medicare funding for home health care from 
BBA97 resulted in substitution from home- and community-based to nursing home living, use of 
the CPS might induce sample-selection bias.  For a number of reasons, we do not believe this 
occurred.  We discuss this in detail in section VII below.5   
Each March file is a cross-sectional, nationally representative sample of households.  
Following Engelhardt (2008), Engelhardt, Gruber, and Perry (2005) and Engelhardt and Gruber 
(2005, 2006), we define “elderly” as all individuals age 65 and older, all of whom are Medicare 
eligible, and we make a distinction between families and households. Specifically, a “family” 
inside of the CPS household is defined as the individual, his or her spouse (if any), and any 
children of the individual who are living in the household and are under the age of 18.   Under 
this definition, there may be more than one “family” in a given CPS “household.”  This could 
occur if there are multiple non-married elderly living together or if an elderly individual resides 
with a non-elderly family.   
Elderly families are defined as those families headed by an elderly individual.  They 
make decisions about household headship and whether to engage in shared living arrangements.  
In contrast, elderly households are defined as those CPS households headed by an elderly 
individual.  They make decisions about homeownership.6    
The questions in the March CPS are about income earned in the previous calendar year, 
so that even though the survey data come from 1996-2001, the income data refer to 1995-2000.  
Even though the transition from IPS to PPS occurred in October, 2000, we follow McKnight 
(2006) and include calendar year 2000 in the sample.  As we discuss below, our findings are 
robust to this assumption.   
In addition, we do not use data prior to 1995.  Specifically, in 1994 the CPS moved to a 
computer-assisted personal interview (CAPI) format, updated its sampling frame based on the 
                                                 
5 Another disadvantage of the CPS is that it does not include measures of health status.  In particular, one might 
expect that the reduction in Medicare generosity would have differentially affected elderly with high (relative to 
low) long-term care costs.  McKnight (2006) was able to exploit this third dimension of variation in her analysis.  
We discuss our work on a separate paper using health measures in the Health and Retirement Study in the 
conclusion.       
6 The CPS only asks the homeownership question to the household head. 
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1990 Census, introduced a new questionnaire, and instituted a number of other changes to the 
survey.   Pitkin (1998) and Masnick, McArdle, and Belsky (1999) have analyzed the effect of 
these changes on measured trends in aggregate homeownership in the 1990s using the CPS.  
They found that, concurrent with these changes, there appears to be an unusually large increase 
in the number of households and the homeownership rate as measured in the CPS between 1994 
and 1996.  In addition, Masnick et al. found that these increases differed by age, state, and 
marital status in a way that suggested the measured changes in homeownership before versus 
after 1994 in the CPS may have been spurious.  Because it is imperative that the estimation 
results not be driven by these survey changes and because the IPS was introduced well after the 
CPS revisions, we limit our sample to data starting in 1996, using data from 1995—the first year 
after the survey revision—as a robustness check.  We describe this more below.      
Pooled across all years, there are 51,856 observations on elderly households and 57,607 
observations on elderly families in the analysis dataset.  There are more elderly families than 
households because some elderly individuals live in shared arrangements in which they are not 
the household head.  Table 1 shows descriptive statistics for selected variables in the analysis. 
 
V.  Time-Series Evidence 
 
 Figure 3 shows the simple time-series relationship between the frequency of shared living 
arrangements and Medicare home health expenditures per user for elderly families from 1995-
2000 for the CPS analysis sample described above.  There is a clear inverse relationship.  As 
expenditures (the solid line) fell with the introduction of IPS in 1998, shared living among the 
elderly (the dashed lines) rose, both for all elderly and the widowed.  Similarly, Figure 4 shows 
the time-series for household headship and Medicare home health expenditures per user for 
elderly families in this period.  In general, as program generosity fell, so did headship.  The 
evidence from both figures suggests that home health care program had important effects on 
elderly housing and living arrangements.   
Figure 5 shows the evolution of the homeownership rate for elderly households for 1995-
2000.  Although it would be expected that greater generosity in long-term care would promote 
homeownership by allowing the elderly to age in place longer, there is no evidence for this in the 
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simple time series.  In fact, as program expenditures per user fell, homeownership actually rose, 
suggesting an inverse relationship.  Overall, Figures 3-5 suggest some impact of home health 
care benefits on elderly living arrangements, but none on homeownership.   
 
VI.  Regression Framework and Identification  
 
There are two obvious drawbacks of the time-series analysis.  First, the time series mask 
the substantial variation in home health care funding that occurred within states over time, due to 
the way the IPS was implemented.  Second, other factors varying over time could be 
confounding those simple trends.  Therefore, to better identify the impact of home health care 
benefits, we move to a regression framework using the micro-data.  
 Specifically, let i , a , s , d, and t  index the household, age, state of residence, Census 
division, and calendar year, respectively, and x  denote a vector that contains a constant and 
demographic and housing cost variables.  Our focal regression specification is for shared living 
arrangements, 
SHARED
iast st iast iast iastD b y uθ β δ= + + +x ,     (1) 
where SHAREDD  is a dummy variable that takes on a value of one if the elderly family is in a 
shared living arrangement and zero otherwise, and u  is a disturbance term.  The explanatory 
variable, y , is log of after-tax total income.  Following Engelhardt (2008), Engelhardt, Gruber, 
and Perry (2005) and Engelhardt and Gruber (2005, 2006), it refers to the sum of money income 
from all sources received by individuals in the family during the calendar year.  Total taxes paid 
are defined as annual federal and state income and payroll taxes and are calculated for each 
family in the household based on demographic characteristics and the sources and amounts of 
income received by family members using the NBER’s TAXSIM Calculator.  The CPS does not 
have enough information on tax deductions to allow for a calculation of itemized deductions, so 
all tax-filing units were assumed to claim the standard deduction.  After-tax family income is 
gross family income less family taxes paid; after-tax household income is defined as gross 
household income (the sum of gross family income across all families in the household) less 
household taxes paid (the sum of family taxes paid across all families in the household).  All 
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income measures were deflated into real 2001 dollars using the all-items Consumer Price Index 
(CPI).   
The vector x  includes dummy variables for the educational attainment of the head (high 
school diploma, some college, and college or advanced degree), marital status (married, 
widowed, and divorced in the pooled sample), white, and female.  These explanatory variables 
control for any other trends in demographic characteristics that might be correlated with state 
expenditures and with housing and living arrangements.  Following Engelhardt (2008), the user-
cost measure is that of Green and Vandell (1998) and incorporates federal tax rates calculated 
from NBER’s TAXSIM calculator.  Because the standard deduction may drive a wedge between 
the marginal and average cost of homeownership, the specification also includes an explanatory 
variable that is the real value of the standard deduction for each observation’s tax filing status.   
Finally, the key explanatory variable is b , the log of Medicare home health expenditures 
per user in that state and calendar year.  Although we will often refer to this measure below as 
the generosity of the long-term care benefits, in practice, expenditures embody both the market 
value of the quality and quantity of the home health care services and probably to some extent 
differences in input costs—primarily nurses’ labor costs—due to differences in the cost of living 
across locations that are not due to quality and quantity per se.  Partly because of this, McKnight 
(2006) and Orsini (2007) used Medicare home health care visits per user to construct their focal 
explanatory variable.  As illustrated in Figure 2, expenditures per user, participation, and visits 
per user track each other very closely, suggesting that the variation in expenditures per user is 
really measuring quality and quantity of home health services.  Indeed, our results are not 
materially different if we use a measure based on visits, for example.  McKnight (2006) had a 
similar finding.  Overall, we believe that expenditures per user is the best measure for our 
purposes.  We will return to this when we discuss our robustness checks below.  
Because b  is expressed in logs, the key parameter, θ , in (1) is a semi-elasticity and 
measures the impact on the frequency of shared living from a doubling of the generosity of 
benefits.  The central hypothesis is that increases in benefits have no impact on living 
arrangements, 0θ = , versus the alternative that increases in benefits reduce the incidence of 
shared living, 0θ < .  
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In principle, the parameters in (1) could be estimated with the micro-data using ordinary 
least squares (OLS) estimation of a linear probability model.  In practice, unfortunately, there are 
two obvious sources of omitted-variable bias with such estimation.  First, older individuals with 
a high demand for privacy, and, therefore, a low demand for shared living, might also have a 
high demand for long-term care benefits.  Failure to adequately control for latent demand would 
lead to an omitted variable that would then be a confounder in the estimation, in this case, 
biasing the estimates away from zero, indicating a response to benefits that is too elastic.  
Second, the incidence of shared living also depends on the supply of potential co-residents, such 
as children and, especially, daughters (Wolf and Soldo, 1988; Wolf, 1994, 1995).  If high benefit 
states also have a greater supply of potential co-residents (another confounder) then simple 
estimates would be biased toward zero, indicating a response to benefits that is too inelastic.7  
Overall, each of these problems would lead to biased and inconsistent regression-based estimates 
of the impact of home health benefits, although the net sign of the bias is unclear.   
To circumvent these problems, we attempt to isolate the causal impact of home health 
benefits on housing and living arrangements by the use of an instrumental-variable estimation 
approach.  Technically, IPS capped agency costs using the 75/25 weighted average described 
above.  However, as McKnight (2006) stresses, the agency-level caps when aggregated up to the 
state level will imply state-level limitations on reimbursement after the law change, too.   
Therefore, we define the instrument, Z, as 
1997% Postst s tZ Cap D≡ Δ × ,     (2) 
which is the product of the percentage change in the home health care reimbursement cap in each 
state as dictated by BBA97 interacted with a dummy variable, 1997PostD , that takes on a value of 
one after the IPS was implemented in 1998 and zero otherwise.  Let 1994P  be the annual 
Medicare home health care payment per user in 1994, then under IPS the percentage change in 
the home health care reimbursement cap for a state is  
1994 1994 1994
1994
(0.75 0.25 )% s d ss
s
P P PCap
P
+ −
Δ ≡ .    (3) 
                                                 
7 The March CPS does not contain any fertility information that would allow the construction of the number of 
children or daughters as a measure of the potential supply of co-residents. 
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That is, before IPS, effectively actual costs were reimbursed; after IPS, reimbursements were 
capped by weighted average of the state’s 1994 average payment (75% weight) and the 1994 
Census division’s average payment (25% weight).  From the perspective of 1998-2000, the post-
law-change period, the 1994 payments are predetermined and, therefore, exogenous, so that, in 
principle, Z , is a valid instrument. 
Column 1 of Table 2 shows the 1994 home health care payments by Census division and 
state; column 2 shows the associated percentage change in the reimbursement cap from the 
movement to IPS.  Across states, there is substantial variation in the generosity of reimbursement 
due to BBA97.  States with above-Census-division-average payments in 1994 got their funding 
restricted under IPS.  Those with below-Census-division-average payments in 1994 got the 
opposite.   
Following Engelhardt (2008), we specify the disturbance term, u , as  
iast s t a at iastu ω γ κ ϕ υ= + + + +  ,    (4) 
where ω  is a vector of state effects, γ  is a vector of calendar-year effects, κ  is a vector of 
effects for the age of the head (by single year of age); φ  is a linear year-of-birth trend; and υ  is 
white noise.  The full set of age dummies controls for differences across single years of age in 
housing and living arrangements; the state dummies control for any differences across states; the 
year dummies control for any general national time trends; and the year-of-birth trend controls 
for any linear trend in across years of birth.  Therefore, after controlling for state and calendar 
year, the IV estimates are identified by state-by-time variation in the instrument from changes in 
the reimbursement cap that began after 1997 due to the switch to IPS in the BBA97.    
 
VII. Estimation Results  
 
Panels A-D of Table 3 show the OLS, first-stage, reduced-form, and IV estimates, 
respectively, of the effect of Medicare home health benefits on the frequency of shared living 
arrangements by marital status for the baseline specification in (1), estimated for 1996-2000.  
Each cell of the table corresponds to a different regression and shows the parameter estimate, θ̂ , 
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with respect to our measure of benefit generosity, the log real expenditure per user, b .8  Robust 
standard errors that are clustered by state are shown in parentheses.  Elasticities evaluated at the 
sample mean are shown in brackets.   
Column 1 begins with the subsample of widowed elderly, the largest group and the one 
that has garnered the greatest amount of policy attention.  In Panel A, the OLS estimate of θ  is 
0.026−  and can be interpreted as follows: when home health care benefits double, the likelihood 
that the typical elderly household resides in a shared living arrangement falls by 2.6 percentage 
points (although this effect is not statistically different from zero).  Relative to a sample mean 
incidence of shared living of 29.7%, this implies an elasticity of shared living to benefits of 
0.09− , which is economically quite small.   
Unfortunately, the OLS estimate might be biased and inconsistent due to omitted 
variables.  Panel B shows the first-stage estimate—the first-stage fit is excellent, with a partial F-
statistic of 9.9.  Panel C shows the reduced-form estimate, which is negative and statistically 
significant from zero.  It is akin to a difference-in-difference estimate of the impact of the law 
change, comparing the shared living response for those in states with large versus small changes 
in the reimbursement cap, before versus after the law change.9  This estimate indicates that the 
incidence of shared living arrangements fell substantially in states that experienced an increase in 
the reimbursement cap due to the implementation of the IPS after 1997.   
Panel D shows the IV estimate, which, compared to the OLS estimate, rises (in absolute 
value) substantially to 0.265−  and is statistically significant at the 4% level.  The implied 
elasticity, shown in brackets is 0.89− .  This indicates the elderly are very responsive in their 
living arrangements to long-term care benefits.  A comparison of the results in panels A and D 
suggests there is substantial bias in estimates that fail to instrument.   
The IV estimate implies that a 10% increase in benefits reduces shared living among the 
widowed by 8.9%.  The average change in the reimbursement cap after the law change was 
1.66%.  The IV estimate in panel D implies that a 1.66% change in benefits would lead to a 
1.48% (not percentage point) change in shared living.  To put this in context, based on the index 
values in Figure 3, shared living rose by about 4% among the widowed, so that the average 
                                                 
8 The estimates for the full set of parameters for all specifications are available upon request from the authors. 
9  McKnight (2006) and Orsini (2007) both estimate reduced-form relationships. 
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change in home health care benefits from the switch to IPS can explain about 37% (i.e., 
0.37 1.48 / 4= ) of the time-series increase in shared living among the widowed in the 1996-2000 
period shown in the figure.   
 
Robustness Checks 
We performed a series of robustness checks.  First, we altered the sample period from 
1996-2000 to 1995-1999.  The associated IV estimate of θ , was 0.19− , significant at the 7% 
level, with an implied elasticity of 0.64− , qualitatively similar to what was found in panel D.  
Second, because there might be other factors moving over time within states correlated with the 
instrument, we estimated a richer specification, shown in panel E.   
We focus on two obvious confounders related to care in skilled nursing facilities, a 
substitute for home care. The primary payer for long-term care is Medicaid, which varies by 
state, with the bulk of expenditures going toward nursing home care.  In panel E, we include a 
control for state-by-calendar-year log real Medicaid expenditure on the elderly, based on data for 
1996-2000 taken from various issues of the Medicare and Medicaid Statistical Supplement.  
Unfortunately, the Medicaid data are not available at the state level prior to 1996, so we could 
not extend this analysis back to 1995.10   
Medicare also reimburses for care in skilled nursing facilities, although the rules differ 
from those of Medicaid.  In particular, Medicare covers costs as long as the nursing home care 
occurs within 30 days of a hospital stay for acute care that lasted three days or longer.  The 
number of skilled-nursing-facility days is limited to 100.  To account for the possibility that 
home health care expenditures are changing within states over time in a manner that is also 
correlated with changes in skilled nursing, we control for state-by-calendar-year log real 
Medicare expenditures per user on skilled nursing facilities taken from various issues of the 
Medicare and Medicaid Statistical Supplement. 
Another important advantage of including these additional controls has to do with the 
concern we outlined above about the key explanatory variable, b , the log of Medicare home 
health expenditures per user: that our estimates thus far may be predicated on both differences in 
                                                 
10 This data limitation is why we originally limited our sample to 1996-2000, as discussed in section IV on data 
construction. 
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benefit generosity and differences in input costs, primarily the cost of nurses’ labor input.  
Because the elasticity of substitution between nurses in home health care and nurses in skilled 
nursing facilities is very high, changes over time within states in labor costs that might have been 
contaminating the estimates of θ  based on expenditures per user will now be accounted for by 
the inclusion of the additional Medicare control.  
With these additional controls, the IV estimate in panel E of θ  is 0.338− , significant at 
the 2.5% level.  The implied elasticity is 1.13− .  Again, these results suggest that elderly living 
arrangements are quite responsive to home health benefits.   
Column 2 of the table gives a parallel set of estimation results for the other major marital 
group, married elderly.  The married have a baseline IV estimated elasticity of shared living to 
home health benefits of 0.4− .  Not surprisingly, this is much less elastic than the widowed and 
not statistically different than zero.  Finally, column 3 of the table gives estimation results for all 
marital groups combined: the widowed, the married, as well as the divorced and never married 
elderly, for whom the sample sizes were too small for separate estimation.  Across all elderly, the 
IV estimated elasticity of shared living to benefits ranges from 0.58−  (in panel D) to 0.83−  (in 
panel E) and is statistically different than zero at conventional levels of significance. 
As outlined above, a potential limitation of our approach is that the CPS does not 
interview institutionalized individuals, thus omitting the elderly in nursing homes.  To the extent 
that the decline in Medicare funding for home health care from BBA97 resulted in substitution 
from home- and community-based to nursing home living, use of the CPS might induce sample-
selection bias.  We do not believe this in an important concern for our results for three reasons.  
First, if there was such substitution, we should observe a marked increase in nursing home use 
after 1997.  Figure 6 plots the number of elderly in Medicaid-funded skilled nursing facilities 
during our sample period.  In contrast to the substitution hypothesis, nursing home use actually 
fell uniformly across this period.  Second, when we regress the log of the number of elderly in 
Medicaid-funded skilled nursing facilities using state-by-calendar-year data from the Medicare 
and Medicaid Statistical Supplement on our instrument and the other explanatory variables in our 
model, the parameter estimate with respect to the instrument is 0.08, an economically small 
magnitude, and a standard error of 0.07, not statistically different from zero.  Thus, there is no 
relationship between nursing home use and the law change in our sample.  Finally, in her 
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regression analysis, McKnight (2006) examined possible links between the adoption of the IPS 
and spending on Medicaid home- and community-based services and found neither an 
economically important nor a statistically significant relationship.  
 A related potential source of selection bias is differential mortality.  The CPS does not 
track individuals until death.  To the extent that the decline in Medicare funding for home health 
care from BBA97 was associated with poorer health and relatively higher mortality for the 
elderly after (relative to before) the law change, then use of the CPS might induce sample-
selection bias.  Unfortunately, we have no direct way of assessing this in our data.  However, we 
note that McKnight (2006) using the MCBS data found no discernable impact of the decline in 
home health care from BBA97 on elderly health (among those living) and no impact on 
mortality.  Based on this evidence, we do not believe this in an important concern about our 
results. 
 
Impact on Household Headship 
Shared living can occur in two forms: a co-resident can become part of the elderly 
family’s household, or the elderly family can become part of the co-resident’s household.  Table 
4 examines the extent to which the changes in living arrangements found in Table 3 are 
associated with changes in household headship by the elderly.  Specifically, Table 4 shows the 
IV estimates of the effect of benefits on the likelihood of headship for elderly families by marital 
status for a headship specification similar to (1): 
HEAD
iast st iast iast iastD b y uθ β δ= + + +x ,     (5) 
where HEADD  is a dummy variable that equals one if the head of the elderly family is also the 
head of the household and zero otherwise.  Each cell of the table corresponds to a different 
regression and shows θ̂ , the parameter estimate with respect to log home health care 
expenditures per user; robust standard errors that are clustered by state are shown in parentheses; 
and, elasticities evaluated at the sample means are shown in brackets.  Panel A gives the baseline 
IV estimates of θ ; panel B gives the IV estimates with additional state-by-calendar-year controls 
for log real expenditures on Medicare skilled nursing facilities and Medicaid spending on the 
elderly, respectively.   
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Across all marital groups and in both panels, there is little evidence that changes in home 
health care benefits alter household headship decisions.  Most of the estimated elasticities are 
economically quite small (very inelastic), and none are statistically different from zero at 
conventional levels of significance.  These results suggest that changes in shared living among 
the elderly in response to home health care occur because a co-resident becomes part of the 
elderly family’s household.   
 
Impact on Homeownership 
Our analysis concludes by examining the extent to which home health care benefits affect 
elderly homeownership.  While there are many housing dimensions on which the elderly could 
adjust behavior, including maintenance, structure type, and home modifications, homeownership 
is the only housing outcome consistently measured in the CPS.  In particular, home health care 
benefits may allow elderly homeowners to age in place longer, forestalling health-related later-
life housing transitions (Venti and Wise, 1989, 1990, 2000, 2001). To explore this, Table 5 
shows the IV estimates of the effect of log real expenditures on homeownership for elderly 
households by marital status for a specification similar to (1) and (5): 
OWN
iast st iast iast iastD b y uθ β δ= + + +x ,    (6) 
where OWND  is a dummy variable that equals one if the elderly household is a homeowner and 
zero otherwise.  Each cell of the table corresponds to a different regression and shows θ̂ , the 
parameter estimate with respect to log home health care expenditures per user; robust standard 
errors that are clustered by state are shown in parentheses; and, elasticities evaluated at the 
sample means are shown in brackets.  Panel A gives the baseline IV estimates of θ ; panel B 
gives the IV estimates with additional state-by-calendar-year controls for log real expenditures 
on Medicare skilled nursing facilities and Medicaid spending on the elderly, respectively.   
For the two primary marital groups, widowed and married, there is little statistically 
significant evidence that greater home health care benefits raise elderly homeownership.   
However, in the pooled sample in column 3, the sample size is sufficient such that there is 
enough precision to reject the null hypothesis of no effect in favor of the alternative that greater 
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home health care benefits raise homeownership at conventional levels of significance.  Over all 
elderly, the IV estimated elasticity of homeownership with respect to benefits is about 0.22. 
 
VIII. Summary and Caveats 
 
There are three primary findings.  First, the weight of empirical evidence from our 
analysis suggests that the changes in the supply of long-term care insurance through Medicare 
home health care benefits that occurred in the late 1990s had an economically important impact 
on elderly living arrangements.  We estimate the elasticity of shared living to benefits to be 0.7−  
over all elderly and 1−  for widowed elderly.  Second, there seems to have been little impact on 
household headship among the elderly.  This suggests that the bulk of the shared-living response 
occurred through co-residents living in elderly households.  Finally, there is some weak evidence 
that increases in benefits raised homeownership.   
Overall, living arrangements appear to quite responsive to home health care benefits.  
Our estimates are much larger than those from the early 1980’s by Hoerger, Picone, and Sloan 
(1996) and Pezzin, Kemper, and Reschovsky (1996)—although the scope of the data and the 
methodologies vary substantially across these studies—but similar in magnitude to estimates 
from the Social Security literature (Michael, Fuchs, and Scott, 1976; McGarry and Schoeni, 
2000; Engelhardt, Gruber, and Perry, 2005; and Engelhardt, 2008). Furthermore, our results are 
qualitatively consistent with those of McKnight (2006)—who found that while private out-of-
pocket medical expenditures rose with the decline in Medicare home health expenditures, there 
was no impact on elderly health—if families substituted informal care for formal care from home 
health care agencies, part of which occurred through shared living arrangements, and Orsini 
(2007), who found a fairly substantial impact on shared living from the law change.   
One important limitation is that the CPS does not include measures of health status.  In 
particular, one might expect that the reduction in Medicare generosity would have differentially 
affected elderly with high (relative to low) long-term care costs.  McKnight (2006) was able to 
exploit this third dimension of variation in her analysis, because the MCBS has information on 
health status.  In a separate paper, we are using information on health status, out-of-pocket 
expenditures, informal care, and detailed data on housing characteristics from the Health and 
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Retirement Study (HRS) to examine the impact of the movement to IPS on the housing, living 
arrangements, and informal care of the elderly in finer detail.  The HRS has some other desirable 
features, too.  It surveys the institutionalized elderly and tracks individuals until death, so that we 
will be able to directly assess whether the movement to IPS resulted in substitution of nursing 
home for home health care or differential mortality.  It also measures maintenance, structure 
type, and home modifications that will help us better assess housing responses to home health 
care benefits.   
A final caveat has to do with external validity.  While we believe we have identified the 
impact of public long-term care insurance for home health care and have demonstrated that such 
insurance can have important impacts on housing and living arrangements, it is unclear how our 
findings might generalize to Medicaid, which is the primary funding source for long-term care in 
general and nursing home care in particular.  The impact of Medicaid on the housing and living 
arrangements of the elderly (Coe, 2007; Greenhalgh-Stanley, 2008), on the demand for private 
long-term care insurance (Brown and Finkelstein, 2007), and the interplay between housing 
wealth and the demand for long-term care insurance and annuities (Davidoff, 2008a, 2008b) are 
important directions for future research.  
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Table 1.  Sample Means for Selected Variables for Elderly Families and 
Households by Marital Status, with Standard Deviations in Parentheses,  
Age 65 and Older, for 1996-2000  
 (1)  (2)  (3) 
 Sample 
 
Variable 
 
Widowed 
 
 
 
Married  
  
Pooled 
A. Elderly Families 
      
Shared Living Arrangement 0.297  0.164  0.249 
      
Household Head 0.865  0.981  0.908 
      
Log Real After-Tax Income 2.590  3.381  2.920 
      
High School Degree 0.344  0.322  0.331 
      
Some College 0.157  0.184  0.172 
      
College Degree 0.064  0.121  0.091 
      
Female  0.816  0.183  0.521 
      
White 0.872  0.916  0.885 
      
Number of Observations 24,734  23,798  57,607 
      
B. Elderly Households 
      
Homeowner 0.736  0.910  0.792 
      
Log Real After-Tax Income  2.640  3.396  2.981 
      
High School Diploma 0.348  0.321  0.331 
      
Some College 0.168  0.185  0.180 
      
College Degree 0.066  0.122  0.095 
      
Female  0.817  0.174  0.500 
      
White 0.882  0.915  0.893 
      
Number of Observations 21,241  23,150  51,856 
Note:  The table shows means calculated from the sample drawn from the 1996-
2001 March CPS, as described in the text.  Standard deviations are in 
parentheses.   All income measures are expressed in 2001 dollars.   
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Table 2.  Change in Medicare Home Health Care Reimbursement by State 
from the Introduction of the Interim Payment System  
in the Balanced Budget Act of 1997 
 (1)    (2) 
 
 
 
Region/State 
 
1994 Program 
Payment Per 
Person Served 
   Percentage 
Change in 
Reimbursement 
Cap 
New England 4,023     
Connecticut 4,367    -1.97 
Maine  3,365    4.89 
Massachusetts 4,328    -1.76 
New Hampshire 2,823    10.62 
Rhode Island 3,753    1.80 
Vermont 2,635    13.17 
      
Middle Atlantic 3,031     
New Jersey 2,702    3.04 
New York 3,334    -2.27 
Pennsylvania 2,899    1.14 
      
East North Central 3,272     
Illinois 3,386    -0.84 
Indiana 4,000    -4.55 
Michigan 3,285    -0.10 
Ohio 3,014    2.14 
Wisconsin 2,586    6.63 
      
West North Central 2,871     
Iowa 2,280    6.48 
Kansas 3,486    -4.41 
Minnesota 2,518    3.50 
Missouri 3,161    -2.29 
Nebraska 2,566    2.97 
North Dakota 2,380    5.16 
South Dakota 2,402    4.88 
      
South Atlantic 4,066     
Delaware 2,478    16.02 
District  of Columbia 3,462    4.36 
Florida 4,595    -2.88 
Georgia 5,215    -5.51 
Maryland 2,859    10.55 
North Carolina 3,287    5.92 
South Carolina 3,764    2.01 
Virginia 3,168    7.09 
West Virginia 2,819    11.06 
      
East South Central 5,329     
Alabama 5,107    1.09 
Kentucky 3,369    14.54 
Mississippi 5,316    0.06 
Tennessee 6,508    -4.53 
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West South Central 5,877     
Arkansas 3,586    15.97 
Louisiana 6,700    -3.07 
Oklahoma 6,035    -0.65 
Texas 5,977    -0.42 
      
Mountain 4,050     
Arizona 3,932    0.75 
Colorado 4,091    -0.25 
Idaho 3,347    5.25 
Montana 3,052    8.17 
Nevada 4,466    -2.33 
New Mexico 3,355    5.18 
Utah 5,481    -6.52 
Wyoming 4,309    -1.50 
      
Pacific 3,862     
Alaska 4,336    -2.73 
California 4,075    -1.31 
Hawaii 3,549    2.20 
Oregon 3,188    5.29 
Washington 3,951    -0.56 
Note:  The table shows the percentage change in the reimbursement cap after 
the 1997 law change.  The source for column 1 is Table 48 in Health Care 
Financing Administration (1996).  The figures in column 2 are the authors’ 
calculations. 
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Table 3.  Ordinary Least Squares, First-Stage, Reduced-Form, and Instrumental 
Variable Parameter Estimates from the Linear Probability Model of the Effect of 
Medicare Home Health Care Expenditures Per User on Shared Living 
Arrangements for Elderly Families, by Marital Status, Using Data for 1996-2000 
from the CPS, Elasticity in Brackets, Standard Errors Clustered by State in 
Parentheses 
 (1)  (2) 
Sample 
 (3) 
 
Explanatory Variable 
 
Widowed 
 
 
 
Married 
  
Pooled 
A. Baseline OLS 
Log Medicare Home 
Health Expenditure Per 
User 
-0.026 
(0.038) 
{-0.09} 
 -0.033 
(0.033) 
{-0.20} 
 -0.016 
(0.021) 
{-0.06} 
      
B. First-Stage  
Instrument 0.895 
(0.285) 
 0.937 
(0.267) 
 0.912 
(0.281) 
      
C. Baseline Reduced-Form 
Instrument -0.237 
(0.099) 
 -0.062 
(0.118) 
 -0.131 
(0.072) 
      
D. Baseline IV 
Log Medicare Home 
Health Expenditure Per 
User 
-0.265 
(0.148) 
{-0.89} 
 -0.066 
(0.128) 
{-0.40} 
 -0.144 
(0.099) 
{-0.58} 
      
E. IV with Controls for Related Medicare and Medicaid Expenditure 
Log Medicare Home 
Health Expenditure Per 
User 
-0.338 
(0.169) 
{-1.13} 
 -0.112 
(0.170) 
{-0.67} 
 -0.206 
(0.113) 
{-0.83} 
      
Number of Observations 24,734  23,798  57,607 
Note:  The dependent variable is a dummy variable that equals one if the family 
head is in a shared living arrangement and zero otherwise.  Robust standard errors 
that are clustered on state are shown in parentheses.  Income is measured in 
thousands of 2001 dollars.  The specifications also include controls for dummy 
variables for single years of age from 65 to 92, calendar years 1996-2000, state 
fixed effects, a year-of-birth linear trend, the real user cost and the real value of 
the standard deduction.  The elasticity of shared living with respect to the 
Medicare home health care expenditure per user is shown in curly brackets.  It 
was calculated based on the parameter estimates shown in the table and sample 
means of the dependent variable shown in Table 1.   
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Table 4.  Instrumental Variable Parameter Estimates from the Linear Probability 
Model of the Effect of Medicare Home Health Care Expenditures Per User on 
Household Headship for Elderly Families, by Marital Status, Using Data for 
1996-2000 from the CPS, Elasticity in Brackets, Standard Errors Clustered by 
State in Parentheses 
 (1)  (2) 
Sample 
 (3) 
 
Explanatory Variable 
 
Widowed 
 
 
 
Married 
  
Pooled 
A. Baseline IV 
Log Medicare Home 
Health Expenditure Per 
User 
0.107 
(0.088) 
{0.12} 
 0.005 
(0.036) 
{0.005} 
 0.036 
(0.053) 
{0.04} 
      
B. IV with Controls for Related Medicare and Medicaid Expenditure 
Log Medicare Home 
Health Expenditure Per 
User 
0.142 
(0.104) 
{0.16} 
 0.007 
(0.051) 
{0.007} 
 0.045 
(0.066) 
{0.05} 
      
Number of Observations 24,734  23,798  57,607 
Note:  The dependent variable is a dummy variable that equals one if the family 
head is in a shared living arrangement and zero otherwise.  Robust standard errors 
that are clustered on state are shown in parentheses.  Income is measured in 
thousands of 2001 dollars.  The specifications also include controls for dummy 
variables for single years of age from 65 to 92, calendar years 1996-2000, state 
fixed effects, a year-of-birth linear trend, the real user cost and the real value of 
the standard deduction.  The elasticity of shared living with respect to the 
Medicare home health care expenditures per user is shown in curly brackets.  It 
was calculated based on the parameter estimates shown in the table and sample 
means of the dependent variable shown in Table 1.   
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Table 5.  Instrumental Variable Parameter Estimates from the Linear Probability 
Model of the Effect of Medicare Home Health Care Expenditures Per User on 
Homeownership for Elderly Households, by Marital Status, Using Data for 1996-
2000 from the CPS, Elasticity in Brackets, Standard Errors Clustered by State in 
Parentheses 
 (1)  (2) 
Sample 
 (3) 
 
Explanatory Variable 
 
Widowed 
 
 
 
Married 
  
Pooled 
A. Baseline IV 
Log Medicare Home 
Health Expenditure 
0.231 
(0.188) 
{0.31} 
 0.080 
(0.098) 
{0.09} 
 0.119 
(0.069) 
{0.24} 
      
B. IV with Controls for Related Medicare and Medicaid Expenditure 
Log Medicare Home 
Health Expenditure 
0.306 
(0.253) 
{0.42} 
 0.115 
(0.128) 
{0.13} 
 0.165 
(0.096) 
{0.21} 
      
Number of Observations 21,241  23,150  51,856 
Note:  The dependent variable is a dummy variable that equals one if the family 
head is in a shared living arrangement and zero otherwise.  Robust standard errors 
that are clustered on state are shown in parentheses.  Income is measured in 
thousands of 2001 dollars.  The specifications also include controls for dummy 
variables for single years of age from 65 to 92, calendar years 1996-2000, state 
fixed effects, a year-of-birth linear trend, the real user cost and the real value of 
the standard deduction.  The elasticity of shared living with respect to the 
Medicare home health care expenditures per user is shown in curly brackets.  It 
was calculated based on the parameter estimates shown in the table and sample 
means of the dependent variable shown in Table 1.   
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